Who shot Sony?

Who shot Sony?

I’m curious about the identity of the group that broke in to Sony, apparently caused massive damage, and compromised a considerable amount of information that belongs to the company.

For some reason, journalists aren’t focusing on this, however. Probably because it doesn’t generate the clicks and ad views that publishing embarrassing emails, salary disclosures, and documented poor security practices do. Instead, they’re primarily focusing on revealing Sony’s confidential information, conveniently provided in multiple, semi-regular doc dumps by the party behind the breach.

Sony’s lawyers recently sent several publications a cease & desist letter, to get reporters to stop publishing the leaked information, since Sony “does not consent to your possession, review, copying, dissemination, publication, uploading, downloading or making any use” of the documents”. There’s been quite a stir that in doing this, Sony is likely invoking the Streisand effect, and it will probably not only backfire, but result in more, not less, coverage of the information.

In information available long before the breach, Sony’s executive director of information security was quoted as saying,“it’s a valid business decision to accept the risk” of a security breach. “I will not invest $10 million to avoid a possible $1 million loss”. Given that sort of security posture, it’s not surprising that even though he was able to talk an auditor out of dinging them for SOX compliance, Sony organizations have faced not one, but two rather devastating hacks in recent years.

So it would seem that Sony’s management is likely to blame for leaving doors open by reinforcing poor security practices and actually fighting back against well-intentioned compliance efforts (thus reinforcing what I’ve long said, “Compliance and security can go hand in hand. But security is never achieved by stamping a system as ‘compliant’.”)

It’s also obvious that the group that hacked in to Sony (perhaps with the assistance of either existing or previous employees), compromised confidential information and destroyed systems deserves a huge amount of blame in terms of the negative effects Sony is currently experiencing. Again, if Sony had proper security in place (and execs more interested in security than rubber-stamping systems), perhaps these people wouldn’t have stood a chance. In terms of media coverage, this is what I’d like to know more about. Who  actually broke in?

However, years from now, when people are looking back at the broad damage caused by the breach and the leaked information, I believe it’ll be important to really note who caused the most damage to Sony over the long run. Yes, the people who broke in started it all. But the damage being caused by journalists taking advantage of the document dumps is, and will continue to, result in significant damage to Sony. For myself, from now on, I’m only linking to, and reposting articles that appear to be using information that has not been sourced from the breach from now on.

I’m no longer feeding the clickbait machine that enthusiastically awaits the next doc drop of Sony confidential information, like a vulture ready to pick them while they’re weak, and expose the inner disfunction of an organization (not something unique to Sony – every org has some level of dysfunction).

On Twitter this morning, I pondered whether the NYT would be so enthusiastic and supportive about the journalistic value of confidential info that was regularly being pushed out by hackers if they themselves had been breached, and it was their secrets, their dysfunction, their personal information, their source lists that was being taken advantage of to generate ad views.

For some reason, I have to think the answer is no. So why are journalists so enthusiastic about kicking Sony while they’re down after a breach?

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